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On The Relationship between Regime Approval and Democratic Transition 
Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado and Gregory A. Petrow, University of Nebraska Omaha1 
Presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association 
Seattle, Washington, August 31-Sept 3, 2011 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Democratic transition scholars find a large number of factors associated with the likelihood of 
non-democratic regimes transitioning to democracy.  Of these, three factors appear to be among 
the most potent:  economic development, economic crisis, and the type of non-democratic 
regime.
2
  However, these structural types of analyses beg the question of how public opinion 
affects national transition to democracy.  In other words, these three factors may affect popular 
attitudes that can create dynamics that foment democratization.  One type of attitude that may be 
especially important is the publics’ approval of non-democratic regimes.  The chief limitation 
that prevents scholars from addressing this question is the absence of data.  However, we have 
access to the largest repository of international public opinion data that is comparable for all 
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nations – the Gallup World Poll.3  The Gallup organization began the World Poll in 2006, and 
now has surveyed approximately 500,000 people in over 150 nations, with a sample intended to 
be representative of 95% of the world’s population.  This allows us access to measures of regime 
approval, as well as other relevant variables, for most non-democratic nations during this time.   
Because five years has passed since the World Poll began, we can consider the 
relationships between regime approval and levels of democratization.  We restrict our analysis to 
a set of 24 nations that were non-democratic in 2005, and we use regime approval to predict pro-
democratic movement in those nations’ institutions.  We use the Polity IV Democracy Score as 
our index of democratization.  The Polity IV Democracy Score is a conceptual scheme that is 
unique in that it examines concomitant qualities of democratic and autocratic authority in 
governing institutions, rather than discreet and mutually exclusive forms of governance. This 
perspective envisions a spectrum of governing authority that spans from fully institutionalized 
autocracies through mixed, or incoherent, authority regimes (termed "anocracies") to fully 
institutionalized democracies. The "Polity Score" captures this regime authority spectrum on a 
21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy).
4
 
                                                          
3
 The Gallup World Poll (Gallup Organization 2006) is a public opinion survey of human well-
being conducted in over 150 countries. We first utilized this dataset to ascertain the extent to 
which the Cuban people approved of the regime, and the extent to which those attitudes 
influenced the trajectory toward democratic governance in the post-Fidel environment. Utilizing 
this Cuban public opinion data, we estimated structural equation models (SEMs) to evaluate the 
possibility of Cuban regime stability and transition.  Specifically, we found that collective 
esteem increased satisfaction with the government.  While we allow that there may be a rise of 
expectations on behalf of the Cuban people for more changes, because of the nature of collective 
esteem in Cuba, it does not necessarily imply a demand for regime change. See, J. Benjamin-
Alvarado and G. Petrow, “Stability, Transition and Regime Approval in Post-Castro Cuba.” 
Political Science Quarterly, (Forthcoming Fall 2011).   
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In this paper we utilize an ordinary least squares regression analysis to ascertain the 
relationship between regime approval and the polity measure of democracy. This is a preliminary 
analysis for a larger research project in which we will incorporate “structural” explanations for 
democratization and democratic transition by estimating structural equation models in which we 
will incorporate several explanations for democratic transition – international integration,5 
economic growth,
6
 repression,
7
 and regime type.
8
  This paper represents the initial exploration of 
this topic.
9
  Controlling for regime type, we expect that lower levels of regime approval lead to a 
greater transition to democracy.   
METHODOLOGY 
 The dependent variable in our analysis in the change in the polity score from 2005 to 
2010 among nations that were non-democratic in 2005.  Negative values of the polity score 
reflect non-democratic nations, and we selected nations that in 2005 ranged from moderately 
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factors affect individual-level factors, with both predicting regime approval, and in turn, 
democratization.  This study will open the black box of how mass politics and public opinion 
affects democratic transition, addressing the question of how structural factors impact the masses 
to encourage, or inhibit, transitions to democracy. 
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non-democratic (at -3) to strongly non-democratic (at -10).  We found 24 such nations.  We use 
the regime approval measure from the Gallup World Poll in those nations to predict the degree to 
which their institutions became more democratic.   
The regime approval variable is a scale composed of four questions from the World Poll.  
The respondents indicated whether or they not had confidence in:  the national government, the 
military, and the courts.  They also indicated if they approved or disapproved of their national 
leaders.  This resulted in a five-point scale, and the alpha was above .60 for all nations.  
RESULTS 
 We turn now to the results in Table 1.  In Table 1 we report the results of an OLS 
Regression in which change in the polity score from 2005 to 2010 is the dependent variable.  
Positive values of this dependent variable indicate nations transitioning in a more democratic 
direction, zero indicates no change at all, and negative values reflect nations transitioning in a 
less democratic way.  We bold the result for our theoretical variable of interest – that for regime 
approval. 
[Table 1 about here] 
 We find that higher levels of regime approval lead to less of a transition toward 
democracy among non-democratic nations (b= -.88, p<.02).  We include a basic set of controls in 
this model.  We control for the demographic characteristics of the national polities.  Considering 
these controls, only age is related at the p<.05 level to democratic transition, with older people 
tending to live in nations that transitioned away from democracy (b= -.02, p<.02).  We also 
controlled for regime type with a series of dummy variables.  The excluded regime type category 
is for nations with democratic institutions.  The only statistically significant result is for the 
theocracy of Iran, with the coefficient indicating that this regime type had a negative influence 
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on democratic transition, once the other variables in the model are accounted for (b= -2.07, 
p<.01).  Finally, the control variables for time are not statistically significant. 
 To confirm that the dependent variable is reflecting transition toward democracy, we 
report Table 2.  We defined a non-democratic nation as one with a polity score of -3 or lower in 
2005.  We then created the difference variable, and we find that most of the nations we count as 
non-democratic in 2005 either did not transition, or they changed in a more democratic direction.  
Three nations moved in a slightly less democratic direction (with a score of -1):  Bahrain, Iran 
and Rwanda.  A host of nations did not change.  However, Sudan and Togo became somewhat 
more democratic (with a +2 change), and Mauritania even a bit more so (with a +3 change).  
Two nations changed dramatically:  Pakistan (+11) and Nepal (+12).  One may be concerned that 
there is little variation on the polity change variable, but we can see that the variance is pretty 
evenly distributed across the categories. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 Finally, we depict our result for regime approval from Table 1 in an intuitive form – the 
change in the predicted polity score.  We report this result in Figure 1.  The vertical axis is the 
change in the Polity score from 2005 to 2010 among all of the non-democratic nations.  The 
horizontal axis reflects the categories of the regime approval scale, with higher values indicating 
higher levels of regime approval.  All values of the regime approval scale indicate a positive 
polity score, showing that the average movement of the non-democratic nations from 2005 to 
2010 was in a democratic direction.  Of course, one notices that the slope is negative, indicating 
that higher levels of approval corresponded with less positive polity change scores.  In other 
words, nations with higher regime approval transitioned less to democracy than nations with 
lower regime approval scores.  All decreases in the average polity score are statistically 
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significant at the p<.05 level, two-tailed.  The bars reflect how the sample divided up among the 
categories of the regime approval scale.  About 40% of the cases clustered at the most positive 
end, while about a third were at the bottom end, with the rest at various points in between. 
CONCLUSION 
 We began by laying out our expectation that approval of regimes in non-democratic 
nations would affect whether or not those nations transitioned to democracy.  One might have 
reason to expect that there wouldn’t be such a relationship.  Perhaps people who disapprove of 
their non-democratic leaders don’t necessarily want democracy.  There is some evidence, 
however, that people in non-democratic regimes do see democracy as something to turn to.  For 
example, one scholar finds that the Chinese who distrust their leaders also have stronger 
preferences for democratic elections.
10
 
 Even if non-democratic regime members do support democracy more as regime 
disapproval rises, these types of regimes still lack any formal institutions through which public 
sentiment can affect the regime.  Perhaps, then, these sentiments lack any way to affect 
democratization.  However, even without formal mechanisms, rulers can still be subject to the 
public will. There are a myriad of informal ways that approval, or disapproval, can manifest 
itself.  One example is public protest.  Another is that the individuals who participate in 
governance may disapprove of the leadership themselves.   
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Table 1.  Regime Approval Predicts Democratic Transition among Non-Democratic 
Nations, 2010-2005 
Independent Variable Coefficient          Standard Error        T-statistic  P-value 
Regime 
approval 
-.88 .35 2.52 <.02 
Demographic 
Controls 
    
Female -.07 .04 1.4 <.20 
Age -.02 .01 2.65 <.02 
Married .56 .30 1.90 <.10 
Standard of 
living 
-.10 .30 .32 <.80 
Entrepreneur -.20 .40 .50 <.70 
Regime types     
Dictatorships 2.15 2.23 .97 <.40 
Monarchies -.77 .55 1.4 <.20 
One Party -.88 .52 1.68 <.15 
Theocracy (Iran) -2.07 .65 3.18 <.01 
Transitioning 3.31 3.82 .87 <.40 
Controls for time     
2007 .88 .57 1.55 <.15 
2008 -.72 .80 .9 <.40 
2009 -.33 .45 .74 <.50 
2010 .27 .71 .38 <.75 
Intercept 1.92 .80 2.41 <.05 
R
2
 = .26  N = 79,375  Standard error adjusted for 25 clusters 
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Table 2.  Distribution of the Change in the Polity Score from 2005 to 2010 among Non-
Democratic nations 
Polity Direction  Survey cases*  Percent of all survey cases 
-1   8,386    10.6 
0   45,297    57.1 
2   4,735    6.0 
3   5,683    7.2 
5   4,795    6.0 
11   6,023    7.6 
12   4,456    5.6 
    79,375    100.1 
* -1 = Bahrain, Iran and Rwanda 
*0 = Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, China, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, 
Laos, Morocco, Qatar, Syria, Tajikistan, Tunisian, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam 
*2 = Sudan and Togo 
*3 = Mauritania 
*11 = Pakistan 
*12 = Nepal 
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